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INTRODUCTION
The eurocurrency market is a market for intermediated funds, where 
eurobanks, acting as intermediaries, place themselves between the depositors of 
funds and the ultimate users of those funds. Like most financial markets, the 
eurocurrency market has a credit and a deposit side. There are two aspects of the 
deposit side of the eurocurrency market which is the subject matter of this article: (1) 
the market dealing primarily with the deposit of short-term funds by depositors and 
the lending of those funds to the final users or borrowers, and (2) the market dealing 
with the interbank placement of funds, where commercial banks borrow and lend, or 
trade eurocurrency among themselves. The operation of the eurocurrency market 
gives rise to legal relationships between eurobanks, their customers and other 
intermediary banks that may be different from the traditional banker customer 
relationship. This article discusses the nature and operation of the eurocurrency 
market and how the legal consequences of the eurobank customer relationship are 
different from the domestic banker customer relationship. It argues that there is a 
need for a redefinition of the common law on the banker customer relationship. 
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A.  The participants in the eurocurrency deposit operation 
Eurocurrency deposit operations involve the placing and taking of deposits. The 
transactions are essentially loan transactions. The owners of the funds place the 
funds in banks or lend these funds, while the depository banks take or accept the 
funds thus placed with them. A typical eurocurrency deposit1 operation will therefore 
usually involve four groups of participants: the original depositors, who, in relation to 
the bank are also lenders of the funds; the depository banks; other intermediary 
banks in the interbank market and the final users of the funds.2
*
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1.
 Although reference is usually made to the eurocurrency deposit, from the legal point of view, there are two aspects of 
the transaction. The transaction is broken down into (1) the traditional deposit arrangement and (2) a separate loan 
transaction. The separate loan transaction is between the depositor as the lender of the funds and the bank as the 
borrower. The loan agreement will specify certain terms including (a) the currency, (b) the place of payment, (c) the 
duration of the deposit, (d) the rates of interest, and (e) the currency and place of repayment   See D. Urech, `Elements 
of `Contractual law in Euromoney Dealings.' (1988) 1 Journal of International Banking Law, p. 14; D. Carreau, `Legal 
Aspects of International Deposit Contracts.' in Hans Smit, Nina Galvaston and Serge Levitsky (eds) International 
Contracts, Albany, NY: Matthew Bender, 1981, p. 147 and Paul Einzig, The Eurodollar System 5th Edn., New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1973, pp. 10-11. 
2.
 It has been argued by some scholars, for example E. Wayne Clendenning, The Eurodollar Market, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1970, p. 16, that the eurocurrency deposit operation involves only three groups of participants. These 
commentators prefer to group both the depository banks and the other intermediary banks in the interbank market, into 
the same category. While this approach may be appropriate as a form of classification, it would seem more appropriate, 
for the purpose achieving clarity in the subsequent analysis of the mechanics of eurocurrency deposit and interbank 
placement operations, to adopt the approach used in this work.
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I.  The depositors 
It is possible to group the initial depositors of eurocurrency funds into three 
categories: official institutions such as government and quasi government bodies, 
central banks, and other depositors of funds, which are neither government nor 
financial institutions. This latter group include international corporations and 
individuals.3 These initial depositors of funds enter the market in a number of ways 
and for a variety of reasons. Official institutions such as governments, government 
bodies and central banks may enter the market directly as suppliers of funds, when 
they deposit a portion of their national reserves of a particular currency in eurobanks. 
The rationale for entering the market in this manner could include the desire to earn 
higher yields than would be possible in their own commercial banks. 
 Central banks may also supply funds indirectly, through the use of swap 
arrangements. In this case, the central banks will sell foreign currency to their 
national commercial banks with the understanding that the commercial banks 
concerned, will use those funds to procure foreign currency assets, reduce their 
liabilities and finance international trade. The central banks will then repurchase the 
currency at a later date. In most cases where such swap arrangements are used, the 
rationale is to further national monetary policy by controlling domestic monetary 
conditions and short-term capital flows. 
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Commercial banks constitute the institutional core of the eurocurrency market. 
Although primarily concerned with their role as intermediaries, commercial banks 
nevertheless contribute to the supply of eurocurrency. They may purchase foreign 
currency and then place these funds in the market or they may use such funds to 
finance the international trade of their customers. When acting as financial 
intermediaries, commercial banks contribute also to the supply of eurocurrency by 
engaging in deposit expansion, that is, the process of placing funds deposited with 
them in the interbank market. 
 Institutions such as private corporations as well as individuals engaged in 
international business, may also supply eurocurrency when they deposit their receipts 
in banks outside the country of issue of the currency involved. Such individuals and 
corporations may possess extensive reserves of foreign currency outside their own 
countries as proceeds from international trade. They may prefer to hold such deposits 
in foreign currency for a variety of reasons. First, they would prefer to hold the 
currency in banks outside the country of issue and their own countries because of the 
higher rates offered. Other reasons could also include the relative convenience of 
holding that particular currency as against others and the cost involved in exchanging 
the currency for local currency. 
 
3.
 Clendenning, supra, note 2, p. 44; Marcia Stigum, The Money Market 3rd Edn, Homewood, Illinois: Dow Jones-Irwin, 
1990, p. 46.
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II. The depository banks 
 The other participants in the offshore currency deposit and placement 
operation, are the commercial banks, acting as depository institutions and, in most 
cases also playing an important role as financial intermediaries. When the 
intermediary(depository) bank takes or accepts funds thus placed with it, it may do 
any of three things: (1) it may lend the deposit directly to borrowers, assuming that 
borrowers who have immediate need for a loan in that currency exist, (2) it may seek 
an outlet for the funds by placing them in the interbank market and (3) it may use 
the funds to meet its own liquidity requirements.  
 
III. The intermediary banks 
 The other participants in the offshore currency deposit and placement process 
are the intermediary banks in the interbank market. Although it is possible to regard 
such banks as belonging in the same category as the initial depository institutions, 
the functions that the interbank market performs in the eurocurrency market, 
necessitates their separate consideration. The eurocurrency market is primarily an 
interbank market where the initial deposit or placement of funds is passed from bank 
to bank under the process of deposit expansion. At one end of the chain of 
transactions is the initial depository bank and at the other end may be the final users 
of the funds. In between these two participants may be a chain of other intermediary 
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commercial banks who take the deposits and loan the funds at narrow margins to 
other banks.4 Interbank eurocurrency trading is conducted both between 
eurocurrency centres and within eurocurrency centres.5 Both forms of interbank 
trading fulfil specific functions.  
 Trading within a eurocurrency centre promotes liquidity smoothing, liquidity 
transfer and currency transfer.6 Liquidity smoothing involves the process where banks 
seek to manage the structure of their assets and liabilities and reduce transaction 
costs. This is usually achieved by the transmutation of assets, during the process of 
financial intermediation. The transmutation of assets takes place when the 
eurobanks, by placing funds in the  interbank market, are able not only to invest in 
claims of the final users and tailor such claims to meet the user's needs, but also to 
change the forms of these claims. They then issue liabilities on themselves, tailored to 
meet the maturity and liquidity needs of the initial depositors or investors. Liquidity 
transfer is the transfer of liquidity from one bank to another, reflecting the reality that 
not all banks are able to attract funds from primary sources. Finally, currency transfer 
involves the process where the eurobanks are enabled to match the currency 
composition of their assets through the use of the interbank market, and thus avoid 
foreign exchange exposure.  
 Interbank trading between centres, on the other hand, promotes global 
liquidity distribution. Global liquidity distribution in simple terms is the process of 
 
4.
 The mechanics of the interbank placement transaction is considered later in the article.
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using the interbank market to normalize the demand and supply of funds in individual 
local markets and to reduce transaction costs that would otherwise prevail in 
transactions between banks of different jurisdictions. The main function of the 
interbank market, is thus to reduce the risk inherent in the operation of the 
eurocurrency market, by spreading such risk among a number of commercial banks 
according to the degree of risk that the particular bank is prepared to accept.  
 
IV. The borrowers: final users of eurocurrency deposits 
 The final users of funds placed in the eurocurrency market, include official 
institutions, commercial banks, other financial institutions, and individuals. Since most 
of these users of the funds may employ the funds borrowed in any number of ways, it 
is difficult to determine in precise terms the exact range of final users. Although 
official institutions play an important role as suppliers of eurocurrency, they are 
relatively small users of such funds as compared to other users. In most cases, 
official users such as governments and quasi government instrumentalities, take 
funds in the form of loans and, depending on the amount involved, the loan may take 
the form of syndicated eurocurrency credits. 
 The predominant users of the funds deposited in the offshore currency market 
are commercial banks. As has been observed above, commercial banks make a great 
deal of use of the interbank market in the process of intermediation. Although 
 
5.
 Eugene Sarver, The Eurocurrency Market Handbook, New York: Prentice Hall, 1988, p. 204.
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commercial banks may channel funds to other users, the offshore currency market 
also serves the liquidity needs of the commercial banks.   
 Other private sector users of eurocurrency are international firms and 
individuals. In all these cases, the users of eurocurrency may incur different kinds of 
liability to the financial intermediaries. For example, while a sovereign borrower may 
take the funds in the form of a syndicated loan, corporations may prefer to issue 
notes or commercial paper in exchange for the funds. 
 
B.  The mechanics of the eurocurrency deposit 
 In the process of moving funds from the initial depositors of the funds to the 
ultimate users, intermediary banks rely on the services of correspondent banks as 
well as electronic funds transfer mechanisms. It is thus appropriate to discuss the role 
of correspondent banks and the electronic funds transfer process, before an 
examination of the mechanics of the placement process. 
 
I. The role of correspondent banks 
 It is important to distinguish correspondent banking from the financial 
intermediation of commercial banks engaged in eurocurrency placements, both of 
which take place in the interbank market. Financial intermediation is the process 
where financial intermediaries, in most cases banks, but which could also include 
 
6.
 Andreas Haindl, The Euromoney Market, Zurich: Verlag Paul Haupt Bern und Stuttgart, 1991, p. 47.
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brokerage houses, place themselves between the suppliers of the funds and the 
users. More often than not, financial intermediation in the interbank market takes 
place as an integral part of the interbank offshore currency placement process. 
 Correspondent banking may also take place in the interbank market, as part of 
the offshore currency deposit and placement process. This is usually the situation 
where an initial deposit is placed in the interbank market by a depository bank, as 
opposed to being loaned directly to a borrower. However, this is the only similarity 
between the two concepts. Correspondent banking refers to the system of “reciprocal 
bank accounts between participating institutions”7 created to facilitate receipts and 
payment in foreign currency.8 Although correspondent banking also occurs in the 
domestic context, this section of this article is concerned with correspondent banking 
in the operation of eurocurrency deposits. In international banking in general, it is 
usual for domestic banks with substantial international affairs to open accounts in 
their names with banks overseas, through and into which payments of foreign 
currency may be made or received. These correspondent accounts are referred to as 
nostro and vostro accounts, primarily in Europe,9 or due from and due to accounts 
respectively in North America.10 Nostro account means our account maintained at 
another institution, while vostro account means your account with us.  
 
7.
 Carreau, supra, note 1, p. 157.
8.
 Donald E. Baker and Ronald E. Brandel, The Law of Electronic Funds Transfers 2nd Edn, New York: Warren, 
Gorham and Lamont, 1988, Ch. 29-2.
9.
 Ibid.
10.
 Stigum, supra, note 3, p. 202.
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Thus if X Bank, located in the US, has deposits of dollars with Y Bank in the 
United Kingdom, the nostro or due from account of X Bank will reflect the amount of 
dollars on deposit with its United Kingdom correspondent - Y Bank.11 Likewise, from 
the perspective of Y Bank, the vostro or due to account of X Bank, will reflect the 
amount of US dollars that the correspondent of Y Bank, X Bank, maintains with it.12 
The process of correspondent banking is facilitated by the use of automated or 
electronic funds transfer systems, by the means of which the accounts of the 
respective banks are debited or credited. 
 
II. The role of electronic funds transfer systems 
 The eurocurrency market works essentially through a network of 
telecommunication lines that link various eurocurrency centres and banks. Although 
there exist other methods of funds transfer, such as the use of airmail, bank cheques 
and drafts, a large percentage of international interbank eurocurrency transfers, are 
effected electronically.13 This is so for several reasons. First, the eurocurrency market 
being a wholesale market deals in large quantities of funds, with relatively short-term 
maturities. It is thus expedient, to use a mode of funds transfer that combines speed 
 
11.
 Baker and Brandel, supra, note 8. 
12.
 Ibid.
13.
 `Banking  Technology:The Interbank Networks.' (1987) Euromoney, p. 128. For an extensive discussion of the law of 
electronic funds transfers, see Benjamin Geva, The Law of Electronic Funds Transfers, Albany, N.Y.: Matthew Bender, 
1992 hereinafter Geva Law of EFT.
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with security.14 Secondly, because eurocurrency transactions usually involve parties 
separated from each other by long distances, it is necessary to use electronic transfer 
systems to bring them closer together. Furthermore, because eurocurrency are funds 
denominated in currency held on the books of banks outside the country of issue, 
except those eurodollars held in International Banking Facilities in the United States, 
the financial institutions concerned do not have access to those currencies with which 
they deal.15 This creates the need for correspondent banks, which may have direct 
access to those funds, and the need to link such institutions together to facilitate 
transactions. The role of electronic funds transfer systems is thus to link financial 
institutions separated by time and space, to facilitate international financial 
transactions. The majority of international funds transfers are processed by two main 
organizations, depending on whether the funds transfer involves the US dollar or 
some other currency. These two organizations are the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)16 and the Clearing House Interbank 
 
14.
 Benjamin Geva, `International Funds Transfers: Performance by Wire Payment.' (1990) 4 Banking and Finance Law 
Review, pp. 113-4.
15.
 Urech, supra, note 1, p. 16; Carreau, supra, note 1, p. 148.
16.
 SWIFT, a non-profit cooperative company organized under Belgian law, was founded in 1973 by 239 European, 
American and Canadian banks and is currently owned by about 1,650 member banks.  Each year the members of SWIFT 
elect a board of directors, which in turn chooses a general manager, vested with the authority to make decisions concerning 
the use of the facilities of SWIFT. Membership of SWIFT is open to organizations engaged in the business of banking and 
in the transmission of financial messages. Currently, the facilities of  SWIFT are used by over 2,600 financial institutions in 
over 65 countries. For other discussion of SWIFT and related aspects of its operations, see generally E. Byler and J.C. 
Baker, `SWIFT:A Fast Method to Facilitate International Financial Transactions.' (1983) 17 Journal of World Trade Law, 
pp. 458-464; J.S. Tallackson and Norma Vallejo, `International Commercial Wire Transfers:The Lack of Standards.' (1986) 
11 North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation, pp. 639-666; John S. Santa Lucia, `Exchange 
Losses from International Electronic Funds Transfers:Time to Unify the Law.' (1988) 8 North Western Journal of 
International Law and Business, pp. 759-787; Herbert Lingl, `Risk Allocation in International Interbank Electronic Funds 
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Payments System (CHIPS).17 While SWIFT is an international communications 
network for all currencies, CHIPS is a department of the New York Clearing House 
Association and is therefore the private clearing system for only US dollars.18 
SWIFT is not a funds transfer system, but facilitates the transfer of funds by 
the provision of a reliable and fast telecommunications network for transmitting 
messages concerning funds.19 Since the primary purpose of SWIFT is to transmit 
messages for its members, the members of SWIFT use its network not only to 
transmit messages concerning funds transfer in a variety of currencies, but also for 
other operations including debit and credit advices, statements, foreign exchange 
operations and money market confirmations, collections, documentary credits, 
interbank securities trading and balance reporting. In the context of the transmission 
of payment messages, the actual settlement of payment between the banks is 
effected by debits and credits to accounts of those banks or to correspondent bank 
accounts.20 
CHIPS is a department of the New York Clearing House Association and is the 
international private clearing system for large dollar transfers. This means that all 
wholesale international transactions involving the use of the dollar go through 
 
Transfers:Chips and SWIFT.' (1981) 22 Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 621-660; Geva Law of EFT, supra, note 
13, Ch. 4-35.
17.
 For other discussion concerning the use of CHIPS and implications, see D.S. Prutzman, `Chips and the Proposed 
Uniform New Payments Code.' (1983) 10 Rutgers Comp.and Tech. Law J., pp. 1-36; Geva, supra, note 16; Geva Law of 
EFT, supra, note 13, Ch. 3. 
18.
 Benjamin Geva, `CHIPS Transfer of Funds.' (1987) 4 Journal of International Banking Law, pp. 208-216; Geva Law 
of EFT, supra, note 13, Ch. 3-23.
19.
 Geva, supra, note 14, p. 116; Geva Law of EFT, supra, note 13, Ch. 4-35, para. 4.03[2].
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CHIPS.21 CHIPS is thus a settlement as well as a communications network.22 Since 
the CHIPS network is the clearing system for eurodollar transactions, its role is limited 
to transmitting payment messages concerning dollar transactions between payor-
sending-bank participants and payee-receiving-bank participants in the New York 
interbank payments system. Almost invariably therefore, a transaction or payments 
message which originates outside the New York Interbank Payments System, and 
involves the use of dollars, originates as a SWIFT message, and is eventually settled, 
in New York via CHIPS.  
 
III. The eurocurrency deposit operation 
 With the above discussion of correspondent banking and the electronic funds 
transfer system that facilitates eurocurrency depositing, as a background, it is now 
possible to examine the nature of a typical eurocurrency deposit and placement 
transaction, and examine the legal relationship that arise in such a transaction. A 
typical situation of the deposit and transfer of funds denominated in US dollars in the 
eurocurrency market could take place in the following manner. Assume the following 
facts: that a fictitious Kingdom of Peruvia has a central bank called Peruvia National 
 
20.
 Geva, supra, note 14, p. 112.
21.
 Sarver, supra, note 4, p. 207; Lingl, supra, note 17, p. 626; Geva Law of EFT, supra, note 13, Ch. 3-23. Theoretically, 
transfers of dollars could also pass through another US wire transfer system, Fedwire. Fedwire is the Federal Reserve 
System's national electronic communications network. While CHIPS makes available `same day funds', Fedwire 
provides `immediately available [Fed] funds.' Although no restrictions are imposed by either CHIPS or Fedwire on the 
kinds of payment transmitted via either system, in practice Fedwire attracts securities transactions while CHIPS attracts 
foreign exchange transactions.  
22. Geva Law of EFT, above, Ch. 3-23, para. 3.03[1].
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Bank. Peruvia National Bank maintains an account with a US based Bank (Citizens 
Bank), into which it receives payment in US dollars. The current balance of Peruvia 
National Bank’s account with Citizens Bank now stands at US$10m. Assume that the 
government and directors of the Peruvia National Bank decide, that instead of letting 
the funds sit idle in the US bank, it could be transferred into a eurodollar account in 
the United Kingdom at an advantageous rate of interest and they conclude a deal 
with the relevant UK bank (Abbey Bank). As discussed previously, the method of 
operating offshore currency deposits in general and eurocurrency deposits, creates a 
distinction between the (1) deposit of funds by depositors who are the lenders of the 
funds and (2) interbank placement or bank-to-bank trading of deposited funds. This 
distinction influences the nature of the current practice in the operation of 
eurocurrency deposits. According to the current practice, when the eurocurrency 
depositor is a sophisticated customer, as opposed to a bank seeking to make an 
interbank placement, it is usual for the eurocurrency deposit to be formally 
documented pursuant to negotiations between such a customer and the depository 
eurobank. Depending on the negotiations between the eurobank and the customer, 
the documentation of the eurocurrency deposit per se, may relate to any of the 
following: a (1) time or fixed term deposit evidenced by a written contract, (2) time 
or fixed term deposit evidenced by a certificate of deposit,23 and (3) call deposit or 
 
23.
 For the purposes of withdrawal, bank deposits may be classified into (1) demand deposits and (2) time or fixed term 
deposits. While demand deposits may be withdrawn or transferred by a depositor without notice, time deposits may only 
be withdrawn at a specified future date or maturity date. Savings deposits, are a kind of time deposit because, in general, 
the bank reserves the right to require notice before withdrawal. However, unlike time deposits evidenced by certificates 
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call money.24 In the scenario being used in this section then the relevant negotiations 
and transfer of funds by Citizens Bank, on behalf of Peruvia National Bank, to Abbey 
Bank, may give rise to a variety of formally documented deposit contracts, which are, 
in reality, loan contracts. The depositor concerned (Peruvia National Bank) is the 
lender of the funds, while the depository institution (Abbey Bank) is the borrower. 
The eurocurrency deposit in question may be a (1) time or fixed term deposit 
evidenced by a written contract, (2) time deposit evidenced by a certificate of 
deposit, and (3) call deposit or call money. A time or fixed term deposit, must be 
distinguished from a call deposit or call money. 
 While a fixed term deposit or time deposit is an interest bearing deposit with a 
specific maturity, a call deposit does not have any specific maturity. Call money is so 
called because it is said to be `on call', that is, it is left on deposit without any specific 
maturity date, and is withdrawable usually on a day's notice. Where a time or fixed 
term deposit is evidenced by a written contract, the written contract, which specifies 
the terms of the contract, constitutes an acceptance by the bank of the terms of the 
 
of deposit and those evidenced by written contracts, which are interest bearing deposits with specific maturities, savings 
deposits do not have fixed maturities. Time or fixed term deposits have not always been evidenced by negotiable 
certificates of deposit (CDs), and currently, may not always be so evidenced. Time deposits began to be evidenced by 
CDs when banks located in London, compelled by the desire to satisfy the demands of their customers for liquidity, 
began to issue dollar denominated CDs. Currently, CDs issued in the London money market are denominated in a 
variety of currencies, including Yen, Can$, Aus$, SDR, ECU, NZ$, Lire, N.Kr., and D.Kr. See generally, London Code 
of Conduct: For Principals and Broking Firms in the Wholesale Markets (1992), London: Bank of England, p. 20, 
hereinafter London Code of Conduct. There is no universally accepted format for time or fixed term deposits evidenced 
by written contract and each bank adopts its own unique contractual format and documentation. 
24.
 A substantial amount of funds placed in offshore accounts take the form of call money. Call accounts may be same 
day value, 2-day notice and 7-day notice accounts. See Stigum,  supra, note 3, p. 225. Call money is more attractive to 
various investors because of its comparative liquidity when compared with time or fixed term deposits. Although a time 
or fixed term deposit bears a higher rate of interest, withdrawal prior to maturity attracts a penalty. 
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loan negotiated. The terms of the time deposit contract,25 will usually include the (1) 
currency of account, (2) duration of the deposit, (3) interest rate, (4) date of the 
deal, (5) value and maturity dates, (6) amount of interest, (7) the place of 
repayment and (8) payment mechanisms and processes. According to current 
practice, call deposits are neither evidenced by formal documentation nor 
standardized confirmations. The only form of documentation of call accounts, are the 
statements that are sent by the depository bank, upon request, via SWIFT, to the 
depositor.26 The reason why call deposits are not formally documented is, that being 
the fastest moving sector of the interbank deposit market, the issuance and 
safekeeping of formal documentation becomes too cumbersome if not expensive. In 
the scenario given above then, if the deposit of `Peruvia National Bank' is a call 
deposit, `Abbey Bank' will send only a statement to `Peruvia National Bank' upon 
request from the latter. 
 In concrete terms, the above eurodollar deal will take place in the following 
manner. Assuming Abbey Bank has no correspondent relationship with Citizens Bank, 
but has a correspondent relationship with another US bank called National Bank, the 
transfer may be effected with the services of the correspondent bank. Following 
 
25.
 For some banks, for example, the Channel Islands Branch of the Royal Bank of Canada, the time or fixed term 
deposit contract is also referred to as a Fixed Term Deposit Confirmation. Despite its name, this is the only 
documentation which a depositor of funds receives, showing the amount of funds held at a eurobank. According to 
market practice then, this documentation, although referred to as a confirmation, constitutes a fixed term contract.
26.
 See Edmund Kwaw Grey Areas in Eurocurrency Deposits and Placements: Towards an International Legal Regime 
(London, Darthmouth, 1990).
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instructions from Abbey Bank, Citizens Bank will effect a transfer via CHIPS, to 
National Bank for the correspondent account of Abbey Bank.27 
Upon receipt of the transfer message National Bank will, in turn, credit the 
vostro account of Abbey Bank. National Bank will then effect a transfer message to 
Abbey Bank using a funds transfer media such as SWIFT. Upon receipt of the transfer 
message, Abbey Bank will credit the account of Peruvia National Bank with the 
amount of US$10 million and it will credit its nostro account with National Bank.   
 According to current practice, a necessary and final safeguard against the 
possibility of dealing errors is provided by the exchange of confirmations between the 
various participants.28 In the scenario being used then, a confirmation will be sent to 
Peruvia National Bank by Abbey Bank showing the funds deposited with the latter. In 
general, a confirmation sent by a receiving bank (Abbey Bank) to the depositor 
(Peruvia National Bank), does not constitute an acknowledgment of funds received by 
the receiving bank (Abbey Bank), but only an agreement concerning the interbank 
placement of the funds to be received. The terms negotiated between Peruvia 
National Bank and the receiving bank (Abbey Bank), as documented on the 
confirmation form, only become effective upon the receipt of the funds by the 
receiving bank.29 With respect to interbank placements, the confirmation sent to the 
transmitting bank, is usually the only documentation concerning the placement of 
 
27.
 If Abbey Bank has a correspondent relationship with Citizens Bank, the transfer operation will take place in the same 
bank, that is, by an in-house transfer.
28. London Code of Conduct: For principals and brokering firms in the wholesale markets (London: Bank of England, 
1992) p. 8, paras. 70-72.
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funds, which the bank receives. Such a confirmation is thus considered to be a 
contract between the banks concerned.   
 Where the fixed term or time deposit is not evidenced by a certificate of 
deposit, a fixed term/time deposit contract or term deposit confirmation is sent to the 
depositor by the eurobank. This is also the only documentation showing funds held at 
the eurobank, which the depositor receives from the eurobank. Upon the receipt of 
funds by the receiving bank then, the confirmation, in addition to being (1) a 
confirmation of the transfer, and (2) an acceptance by the receiving bank of the 
terms, is also (3) a fixed term deposit contract, or time deposit contract. Although a 
reference is being made to receipt of funds, the actual specie in dollars, is not actually 
received by the receiving bank in the UK. The term, receipt of funds, denotes the 
process whereby a credit to the vostro account of the receiving bank - Abbey Bank - 
and a corresponding credit to the accounts of Citizens Bank and National Bank at the 
Federal Reserve, operates to produce payment to Abbey Bank.  
 As a result of the above transactions, specific accounting entries will be made 
in this manner. The books of Abbey Bank will show a credit in favour of Peruvia 
National Bank to the tune of US$10 million and a corresponding liability on its own 
part. In the books of National Bank, the vostro or due to account of Abbey Bank, will 
be credited with the amount of US$10 million. The books of Citizens Bank will show a 
debit of the same amount with respect to the account of Peruvia National Bank. The 
 
29.
 Some confirmations will have a stipulation to that effect.
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book entries made with Abbey Bank in the UK thus reflect the corresponding entries 
made in the books of its correspondent, National Bank, in the US. This in turn reflects 
the changing nature of the claims involved. They are therefore not independent 
accounts and have sometimes been referred to as mirror accounts.30 
By giving up its claim against Citizens Bank, Peruvia National Bank now 
acquires a claim against a UK bank, Abbey Bank. Likewise, the original claim held by 
Peruvia National Bank against Citizens Bank now becomes a claim of the UK bank, 
Abbey Bank, against the US bank, National Bank. Payment or settlement as between 
the two US banks: Citizens Bank and National Bank, will usually be effected by the 
transfer of funds from and to accounts which both banks maintain with the federal 
reserve.                          
 Thus although Peruvia National Bank regards itself as holding dollars in Abbey 
Bank in the United Kingdom, the funds which are the subject matter of the deposit 
and transfer operation, never in fact leave the United States. All that happens is, that 
because Abbey Bank possesses a correspondent account with National Bank in the 
US, a transfer from the Federal Reserve account of Citizens Bank to that of National 
Bank, at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, operates to transfer the funds from 
Citizens Bank in the US, to Abbey Bank in the United Kingdom. It is this kind of 
transfer operation which some writers have in mind when they argue, that in the 
funds transfer process, the funds, in this case dollars, never leave the country of 
 
30.
 Carreau, supra, note 1, p. 160.
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issue.31 The scenario involving Peruvia National Bank  is intended to illustrate what 
has come to be accepted as the usual practice of the eurodollar deposit operation in 
particular and eurocurrency operations in general.32 
(i)  The deposit repayment process 
The repayment of a eurocurrency deposit may be effected in two main ways. 
The first way of repaying a eurocurrency deposit, is with the use of `in-house' or 
correspondent bank transfers.33 The second method is to effect payment via the 
country of issue of the currency which is the subject matter of the deposit contract. 
 
31.
 Stigum, supra, note 3, p. 200; Haindl, supra, note 6, p. 50.
32.
 Roy M. Goode, `Concepts of Payment in Relation to the Expropriation or Freezing of Bank Deposits' (1987) 2 
Journal of International Banking Law, pp. 82-83. See also Marco Jagmeti, `Money and Payment.' (1981) 9 
International Business Lawyer, p. 95, Kwaw, supra, note 26.
33.
 Hal Scott, `Where are the Eurodollars? - Offshore Funds Transfers.' (1988-89) 3 Banking and Finance Law Review, 
pp. 282-286.
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1.  Repayment by in-house transfers 
 An in-house transfer generally refers to the transfer of funds between accounts 
held at either the same branch of a bank or at different branches of the same bank. 
Where two parties, A and B, maintain accounts at the same branch, and A wants to 
make payment to B, an in-house transfer may be used to effect payment. The bank 
concerned merely debits the account of A, and credits the account of B. In the 
international context, the use of an in-house transfer to effect payment may take 
place with or without the intermediary assistance of a correspondent bank. Assume 
that Peruvia National Bank, in the scenario used above, wishes to be repaid its US$10 
million held at Abbey Bank in the UK, an in-house transfer, without the assistance of 
a correspondent bank, could be used to effect payment. This is possible where both 
Abbey Bank and Peruvia National Bank have correspondent account relationships with 
the same bank. Suppose both Peruvia National Bank and Abbey Bank maintain 
accounts with another bank in France called Banque Internationale, all that is 
necessary to repay the deposit of Peruvia National Bank, is for Abbey Bank to debit 
the account of Peruvia National Bank and then instruct Banque Internationale to 
transfer the funds from its account into that of Peruvia National Bank. Banque 
Internationale will then debit the vostro account of Abbey Bank and credit the vostro 
account of Peruvia National Bank. The transfer of funds in between accounts 
maintained at the same bank is the in-house transfer.  
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2.  Repayment by correspondent bank transfers 
 In the international context, where the banks or parties concerned do not 
maintain an account with the same branch of a bank, the services of a correspondent 
bank are usually required to facilitate the transfer of funds from payor to payee at the 
different banks. Correspondent banking, it may be recalled, refers to the system of 
reciprocal bank account relationships between banks. 
 Although correspondent banking is also used in the domestic context, in the 
international context it facilitates receipts and payments of foreign currency. In a very 
simple correspondent bank transfer, a sending or originating bank upon the receipt of 
instructions from its customer, will effect a transfer message to another bank (the 
receiving bank) to make payment to a payee who maintains an account at the 
receiving bank. Payment as between the sending or originating bank and the 
receiving bank is effected by corresponding debit and credit entries to correspondent 
accounts maintained with each other. This usually means that the originating or 
sending bank must have sufficient funds in its correspondent account with the 
receiving bank, to cover the amount of the transfer.  
 In international banking transactions and eurocurrency transactions for that 
matter, correspondent banks may be used to transfer funds either to and from (1) 
parties who hold funds with banks outside countries of issue, or (2) parties who hold 
funds with banks inside countries of issue. In the latter situation, this usually involves 
the use of the clearing and settlement system of the country of issue. 
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3.  Repayment via the clearing system of the country of issue 
The repayment of eurocurrency does not have to pass through the clearing and 
settlement system of the country of issue where in-house and correspondent bank 
transfers are used. However, this is the current practice. When a eurobank accepts a 
deposit denominated in the currency of another country it undertakes certain 
obligations, including the obligation to repay, which, in most cases is carried out by 
causing acts that take place in the country of issue of the currency concerned.34 This 
is because, as a general rule, most payment obligations involving the delivery and 
collection of eurocurrency take place in the country of issue according to the rules of 
its clearing system. In the scenario used above then, the repayment obligation of 
Abbey Bank, located in the UK, although capable of being performed outside the US 
in the manner described above, will, according to current practice, be performed in 
the US. This will be done by the delivery and collection of dollars in National Bank or 
another bank in the US nominated by the customer, Peruvia National Bank.  
 Since repayments of eurocurrency are so frequently made through the country 
of issue of the currency concerned, as opposed to the use of in-house and 
correspondent bank transfers, it is possible to argue that it is an implied term of 
eurocurrency deposit contracts that repayments are to be made via the clearing and 
 
34.
 Goode, supra, note 32; Jagmeti, supra, note 32; Carreau, supra, note 1, pp. 161-163; Edmund Kwaw, “Determining 
the Proper Law to Govern the Eurocurrency Deposit Contract.”(1993) 18 Queen's Law Journal, p. 445. 
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settlement system of the country of issue.35 This is also dictated by practical 
considerations.  
 Only a globally organized system for clearing and netting large sums in a 
variety of currencies, will lead to an efficient functioning of the repayments process.36 
Since no such organization exists, all payments of eurocurrency have to go through 
the only systems which currently possess the facilities for collecting and netting large 
sums of foreign currency: the clearing systems of the countries of issue.37 This is 
purely practical, given that (1) central banks of the countries of issue of various major 
currencies are the only ones which will accept the responsibility for supplying 
unlimited quantities of that currency and (2) these central banks are committed only 
to their own clearing banks.   
 Unlike the domestic banking context then, in the eurocurrency deposit context 
there are three stages in the repayment process, namely (a) the demand for 
payment, (b) the preparation by the offshore bank to effect payment and (c) actual 
payment, that is, the delivery of funds by a bank in the country of issue. While all 
three stages may take place in the same bank in the domestic context, only the first 
two stages take place at the eurobank in the eurocurrency deposit context. Thus in 
the above scenario, when Peruvia National Bank wishes to be repaid its deposit, it will 
make a demand to be repaid in the UK at the branch of Abbey Bank where the 
 
35.
 Goode, above.
36.
 Carreau, supra, note 1, p. 161. See also the similar arguments of John E. Hoffman, ‘The Iranian Assets Litigation” 
Private Investors Abroad: Problems and Solutions in International Business in 1980, Albany, N.Y.: Matthew Bender, 
1980, p. 350. 
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deposit is maintained. Since Abbey Bank does not have access to the funds, it can 
only instruct its correspondent in the country of issue to make the relevant transfer to 
the account of Peruvia National Bank, against a promise by Abbey Bank to 
subsequently provide cover.38 Abbey Bank consequently sends a transfer message for 
that purpose. This is the second stage in the process of repaying eurocurrency or 
what this work refers to as the preparation to make repayment. The third stage, the 
actual delivery of the funds: payment per se, although capable of avoiding the 
clearing system of the US, as explained above, will, in most cases, take place in the 
US. The account of Peruvia National Bank is then credited and the corresponding 
debits and credits are effected in the accounts of Citizens Bank and National Bank at 
the Federal Reserve Bank.  
 
(ii)  The interbank placement operation 
 As observed at the beginning of this chapter, the deposit side of the 
eurocurrency market also includes the bank-to-bank deposit of funds, or the 
interbank placement. The mechanics of the interbank placement process may be 
described using the hypothetical eurocurrency deposit operation discussed above. 
Using this scenario then, assuming that Abbey Bank, after receiving the deposit of 
Peruvia National Bank does not want the funds to sit idle on its books in the UK, it 
may decide to place it in the interbank market by depositing it with another eurobank 
 
37.
 Carreau, above; Hoffman, above.
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in France (Banque Internationale). This assumes that Banque Internationale is 
prepared to pay a higher rate for the funds. If Banque Internationale also cannot find 
immediate use for the funds deposited with it, it will also deposit it in the interbank 
market. At each stage in this interbank placement process, the next bank pays a 
slightly higher rate than the previous bank does. The margins involved in the 
interbank market are usually very small. It is important to note, that the redepositing 
of the funds in the interbank market, does not add to the final extension of credit in 
the financial markets, but only involves the passing of funds from bank to bank.  
 The mechanics of the interbank placement operation involving some or all of 
the above parties could take place in the following manner. Abbey Bank will contact 
Banque Internationale over the phone and request the latter to provide it with its bid 
or deposit rates for deposits of various maturities in both France and England. 
Assuming the rate available in the Paris branch of Banque Internationale is higher, 
Abbey Bank will negotiate with Banque Internationale (Paris) to place the US$10 
million for example, for one month, in the Paris branch of the latter bank. After an 
agreement is reached, the relevant book entries are made. If Banque Internationale 
also cannot find immediate use for the funds, it may also decide to deposit it with its 
London branch, which may decide to take the deposit on its books at approximately 
1/32 of 1 per cent over the rate paid by the Paris branch. In this case the second 
funds placement takes place between two branches of the same bank. 
 
38.
 Urech, supra, note 1, p. 16.
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1.  The role of brokerage firms 
 The above interbank placement operations could also take place with the 
assistance of brokerage firms. For example, if the London branch of Banque 
Internationale decides to invest the $10 million deposited with it at a profit, it may 
seek to lend the funds at as high a rate as possible. The use of a brokerage firm 
becomes indispensable in this context. Since it is generally difficult to find the 
appropriate bank, willing to pay the appropriate rate, brokers, who possess a 
comparative advantage in the possession of the relevant information, act as 
intermediaries between banks in the interbank market. Thus, the London branch of 
Banque Internationale may request a brokerage firm to provide it with the bid or 
deposit rates offered by various banks for call, 7-day, 30-day, 90-day,180-day and 
270-day deposits, denominated in a variety of currencies. On this basis, the London 
branch of Banque Internationale is able to make an informed decision as to whether it 
wants to place the funds or swap currencies. Assuming it decides to place the funds 
at a bank in Japan, Sumitomo Bank, it will convey this decision to the broker. The 
broker will then contact the eurocurrency dealing department of Sumitomo Bank by 
phone or telex, to close the deal. The broker earns a fee of about 1/32 of 1 per cent. 
Confirmation of the deal is transmitted to the London branch of Banque Internationale 
and the message to transfer funds to the Japanese bank, is transmitted via SWIFT, to 
correspondent banks in Japan, which then effect the transfer. 
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As already noted above, as between banks, the interbank placement of 
eurocurrency is not formally documented, only confirmations are sent between the 
parties. Thus, while the deposit contract between Peruvia National Bank and Abbey 
Bank may be formally evidenced by a certificate of deposit or a fixed term deposit 
contract, the interbank placement operations between Abbey Bank and Banque 
Internationale in Paris, or that between Banque Internationale in London, and 
Sumitomo Bank in Japan, are not evidenced by formal contractual documents but by 
mere entries on the books of the banks concerned.  All transactions are carried out 
informally via the telephone, telex or fax and confirmations of the deal are 
exchanged. Confirmations of financial deals may also be made by telephone, in 
writing or using other electronic media.  
 Although there is no standardized format for such confirmations, for banks 
operating in the London wholesale markets, the London Code of Conduct39 
recommends that all such confirmations sent by banks and other financial institutions 
engaged in wholesale market deals, include all the details of the transaction 
concerned.40 The current practice however is, that banks participating in the 
international money markets usually include their own terms and conditions of 
trading, in addition to the details of the deal, on such confirmations. According to a 
Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) standing order,41 for example, offshore branches of the 
 
39.
 Supra, note 29.
40.
 Ibid., p. 9, paras. 73-74.
41. Royal Bank of Canada: Standing Order No. 8.05, Deal Confirmations Revised 1992, Royal Bank of Canada, 
London, hereinafter RBC Standing Order No. 8.05. 
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RBC in issuing confirmations of deposit deals (whether by telephone or in writing), 
must include details including, (1) the banks full name and address, including 
telephone and fax numbers, (2) the type of transaction, (3) the counterparty's full 
name and address, (4) the amounts and currencies involved, (5) the value and 
maturity dates, (6) the interest rates agreed upon, including the basis of calculation, 
that is, whether 360 or 365 days, and (7) details concerning payment. It is therefore 
reasonable to infer, that Sumitomo Bank will send a confirmation to the London 
branch of Banque Internationale containing similar terms.42 As mentioned before, 
since such written confirmations are the only documents showing monies held at the 
other banks which the banks placing the funds will receive, such confirmations are 
regarded as contracts, according to market practice. 
 
C. The Legal Relationships 
 The deposit and placement of eurocurrency on the one hand, and the process 
of making payment via electronic funds transfers, gives rise to legal relationships 
between the participants involved. These relationships include that between the (1) 
depositary bank and the customer, (2) depositary bank and the correspondent bank, 
(3) customer and the correspondent bank, and (4) beneficiary/destination bank and 
 
42.
 It is the current practice, for example, of the Royal Bank of Canada, in London to regard telephone confirmations as 
only temporary. Telephone confirmations, according to RBC Standing Order No. 8.05, supra, note 46, are to be 
recorded and kept until all transactions are paper confirmed and settlement effected. Written confirmations are also to be 
kept until matching confirmations are received from the other bank.
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the payee. Although these same legal relationships could occur in the domestic 
context, the legal significance of these relationships differ in the eurobanking context.  
 
                                The evolving  eurobank-customer relationship 31
I. The relationship between customer and eurobank 
 In the eurobanking context, the relationship between the customer and the 
eurobank can be divided into two stages, namely the depositary relationship and the 
funds transfer relationship. The depositary relationship is concerned with the opening 
of the eurocurrency account and the subsequent transfer of funds into that account, 
and the funds transfer relationship is concerned with the transfer of funds from the 
account into another account specified by the customer.  
 
(i) The depositary relationship 
 Similarly to the deposit relationship in the domestic context, the legal character 
of the depositary relationship in the eurobanking context is that of a contract and falls 
within the general common law rules regarding ordinary accounts in the banker-
customer relationship.43 Like the relationship between the banker and the customer 
for ordinary or general deposits in the common law, the relationship between the 
depositary eurobank and the customer commences immediately both parties begin 
negotiations and enter into a relationship which is to be part of the contract to be 
 
43.
 It is important to observe that there are varieties of banker-customer relationships. For instance, the relationship 
between the bank and its customer when the bank provides financial advise, is considered to be fiduciary. As well, where 
a customer places personal property in a bank for safe keeping, the relationship becomes one of bailment. See the 
discussion of  Margaret H. Ogilvie Canadian Banking Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1991) p. 411. See Foley v. Hill (1848), 
2 HL Cas 28, 9 E.R. 1002 (H.L.); Burnet v. Westminster Bank Ltd,[1966] 1 QB 742, [1965] 3 All ER 81 (Q.B.D.).
32 Edmund Kwaw
ultimately concluded.44 Generally, negotiations that do not result in any agreement, 
cannot establish a relationship.45 
The contractual depositary relationship between the eurobank and the 
customer, like the ordinary banker-customer deposit relationship consists of 
reciprocal rights and duties that are founded on the practices and usages of domestic 
banking as well as the eurocurrency market. The classic statement of the nature of 
the reciprocal rights and duties of a depositing customer and the bank, in the 
domestic context, is that of Atkin  L.J. in Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corporation.46 
According to Atkin L.J., in the domestic context, when a customer deposits money 
with a bank, 
 
"the bank undertakes to receive money and to collect bills for its 
customer's account. The proceeds so received are not to be held in trust 
for the customer, but the bank borrows the proceeds and undertakes to 
repay them. The promise to repay is to repay at the branch of the bank 
where the account is kept, and during banking hours...The customer on 
his part undertakes to exercise reasonable care in executing his written 
orders so as not to mislead the bank or to facilitate a forgery. I think it 
is necessarily term of such a contract that the bank is not liable to pay 
the customer the full amount of his balance until he demands payment 
 
44.
 Mark Hapgood Paget's Law of Banking 10th Ed.(London: Butterworths, 1989) p. 160.
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from the bank at the branch at which the current account is kept." 
(emphasis added) 
 
Thus in both the traditional domestic banker customer deposit relationship, and 
the eurobanking relationship, the legal character of the contractual relationship 
between the bank and its customer is that of debtor and creditor. The depositor is the 
creditor and the bank is the debtor.47 The deposit is a loan and in the absence of any 
special agreement that qualifies the relationship,48 the deposit becomes the property 
of the bank.49 In this traditional relationship, then, the bank is not the bailee of the 
customer neither does it hold the money in any fiduciary capacity. The legal title to 
the funds passes to the bank50 and it has the right to mix it with other funds and to 
use as it sees fit. A liability in favour of the depositor is thus created. Since title to the 
 
45.
 Ibid.
46.
 [1921]  3 K.B. 110, p. 127 (C.A.), hereinafter Joachimson.
47. Foley  v. Hill, supra, note 43; Joachimson, above; R v. Davenport,[1954] 1 All ER 602 (C. Cr. App.); Laing v. Bank 
of New South Wales(1952), 69 WN (H. Ct. NSW) 318. Although the High Court decision in the Laing case was reversed 
by the Privy Council, it was not with respect to the nature of the banker customer relationship. For relevant U.S and 
Canadian decisions see generally New York County National Bank v. Massey, 192 US 138, 24 S.Ct. 199, 48 L. Ed. 380
(1904); United States v. First National City Bank 321 F. 2d 15 (2nd Cir. 1963); Royal Bank of Canada v. Boyce (1966), 
57 D.L.R.(2d) 683 (Ont. Co. Ct.); Bank of Ottawa v. Hood (1908), 42 S.C.R. 231; Everly v. Dunkley (1912), 27 O.L.R. 
414 (C.A.).  
48.
 Deposits made with banks could be divided into two classes: special deposits and general deposits. With special 
deposits, the bank becomes the bailee of the customer and title to the money still remains with the customer. It has been 
held for instance that a deposit of money or property merely for safe keeping, is a special deposit. Such a special deposit 
may be in a safe deposit box or otherwise kept separately. The only determining criteria seems to be whether the 
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segregated  and (3) to be returned intact on demand. With general deposits, the money is deposited in accordance with 
normal banking customs. The depositor, for his/her own  convenience, parts with title to the money and lends it to the 
bank. The bank in consideration of the loan of the money and the right to use it as it sees fit, agrees to refund the money 
either in whole or in part, upon demand.
49. Foley v. Hill, supra, note 43, and Royal Trust Co. v. Molsons Bank (1912), 27 O.L.R. 441 (H.C.).
50.
 See R v. Davenport, supra, note 47.
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money passes to the bank until demand is made, the bank cannot be said to have a 
lien on such funds that it owns.51 
This is where the similarity ends between the domestic deposit relationship and 
the eurobanking relationship. The traditional common law rules and the approach of 
the eurobanking system differ when it comes to the repayment of the deposit by the 
bank.   
 
(a) The problem of repayment and the place of repayment 
Lord Atkin’s well cited dictum provides that the promise of a bank to repay 
funds held on deposit is to do so at the branch of the bank where the account is kept. 
This approach of Lord Atkin with respect to the repayment obligation of a bank is 
based on the idea, derived from the era of the goldsmiths and the use of currency 
and coins in modern times, that money on deposit is specie or cash that has a situs 
or location. Where money is specie or cash held by a branch of a bank where a 
customer has an account, it makes sense that the customer has to make a demand 
at that branch for repayment of his or her deposit.52 The traditional common law 
approach to repayment is limited when it is applied to the eurocurrency market.   
 
51.
 See Liberty Savings Association v. Sun Bank, 572 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1978) and Michie on Banks and Banking Vol. 
5A, 1983 Replacement Volume(Charlottesville Va: The Michie Company Law Publishers, 1983) p. 37.
52
 For an extensive discussion of the origins of the concept of payment see, Edmund Kwaw, supra, note 26, at 
Chapter 6; and “Redefining the concept of payment” (1997), 2 Canadian Journal of International Business Law & 
Policy, at 199; F.A. Mann, The Legal Aspect of  Money 5th Ed. (London, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Paul 
Einzig Primitive Money (London, Pergamon Press, 1966); Benjamin Geva “From commodity to currency in ancient 
history: On commerce Tyranny and the modern law of money,” (1987), 25 Osgoode Hall Law Journal.  
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As indicated above, when a customer such as Peruvia National Bank, in the 
above scenario, transfers funds from its account with Citizens bank in the United 
States into a eurodollar account with Abbey Bank in the United Kingdom, no transfer, 
in the sense of a transfer of specie or cash takes place. The obligation of Citizens 
Bank is not assigned to Abbey Bank. What happens is that upon the transfer of funds 
from Citizens Bank to Abbey Bank, the obligation of Citizens Bank to pay is notionally 
extinguished and is replaced by the obligation of Abbey Bank to pay the same amount 
that is transferred. However, because no transfer of cash or specie has actually taken 
place, Peruvia National Bank cannot obtain payment from Abbey Bank. It can demand 
payment from Abbey Bank, but because Abbey Bank, per se, has no funds, the only 
obligation of Abbey bank is to initiate the process that will result in Peruvia National 
Bank obtaining payment either via the clearing and settlement process in the United 
States, or via in-house or correspondent bank transfers.  
 The shortcomings of the traditional common law respecting payment as well as 
other matters, was exposed in Bank Markhazi Iran v. Citibank,53 and Libya Arab 
Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co.54 
53. Bank Markazi, supra, note 1.
54
 [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Reports 259 (Q.B. Co. Ct.)
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1. Bank Markhazi Iran v. Citibank 
In Bank Makhazi Iran v. Citibank, President Carter of the United States, 
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,55 imposed a freeze 
on the worldwide assets of the Government of Iran in response to the seizure of the 
US embassy in Teheran and the capture of hostages found in the compound as well 
as the perceived threat to international world order posed by the Iranian regime.56 At 
the time of the freeze order, Iranian assets that were subject to the freeze order, 
were in the region of US$6 billion and were held at the London branches of US banks. 
These assets collectively belonged to Bank Markazi Iran 
 In November 1979, Bank Markhazi Iran, seeking to challenge the legality of the 
freeze order, commenced an action in London against the US banks. The statement 
of claim of Bank Markhazi Iran, among other things, stated that (1) the defendant 
was indebted to it for certain amounts in US dollars, being money held on account for 
it at the London branch of the defendant, (2) it also owed payments of interest which 
 
55.
 50  U.S.C.  paras. 1701-1706 (1982 & Supp V, 1987). The statute, where relevant states as follows: `Sec. 203(a) At 
times and to the extent specified in section 202, the President may, under regulations as he may prescribe, by means of 
instructions, licenses, or otherwise - (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit - (i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) 
transfers of credit or payments between, by, through or to any banking institution to the extent that such transfers or 
payments involve any interests of any foreign country or national thereof..., (B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel,
nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit any acquisition, holding withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, 
importation, exportation of, or dealing in... any property in which any foreign country or national thereof has an interest; 
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.'
56. Peter S. Smedresman and Andreas Lowenfeld, `Eurodollars, Multinational Banks and National Laws' (1989) 
64 New York University Law Review, p. 747. In 1979, a period of 10 days after the hostage incident in Teheran, the 
president issued an executive order, blocking any official assets of Iran subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or 
which came into the possession of persons who were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
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had been demanded but had not been repaid.57 
In their pleadings, Citibank as well as the other defendant banks put forward 
various arguments that they said justified their refusal to pay. One of these 
arguments is important for this article. It was argued that payment could not be 
made because of the freeze order, which explicitly referred to assets held by US 
persons overseas. It was further argued, that even if the court in London held that 
the freeze order was void in the UK, the order still made it illegal for the US banks to 
make payment. The defendant also argued that it was well known to the depositor, 
Bank Markhazi Iran, that no payments could be made per se in London without the 
transfers going through the New York clearing system. Therefore any payment that 
would be made would immediately be subject to the freeze order. Payment to Bank 
Markhazi Iran was therefore impossible. In making this argument, the defendants in 
this case thus sought to draw a distinction between the repayment of an ordinary 
domestic deposit, and the repayment of a eurocurrency deposit. Unlike a domestic 
deposit, Bank Markhazi Iran’s deposit could not be repaid where the account was 
held.    
 The case however never went to trial and so it is difficult to determine if the 
Court would have redefined the repayment obligation of banks, and held that Bank 
Markhazi Iran had to be repaid in the United States, or whether it would have 
adhered to the traditional approach. Both French and English courts denied summary 
 
57.
 Smedresman and Lowenfeld, above, p. 750, note 54 citing the writ of Bank Markazi, dated 30th Nov. 1979.
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judgement and commissioned groups of experts to look into the issues raised and set 
dates for trial. However, all suits were subsequently abandoned when the hostages 
were released as a result of the Algiers Accords of January 19th, 1981.58 The issue of 
whether the Courts will, on the one hand, recognize the developing eurobanking 
reality and modify or move away from the well known dictum of Lord Atkin and 
redefine the law on repayment or, on the other hand, adhere to the traditional 
approach, was answered somewhat in Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co.
Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust is also important because it also raised 
other issues regarding the adequacy of the common law on the banker customer 
relationship.    
 
2. Libya Arab Foreign Bank. v. Citibank 
Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Citibank also involved the imposition of a freeze, 
pursuant to an Executive Order59 of President Ronald Reagan, on the assets of Libya 
by the United States of America. At the time of the freeze, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, 
 
58.
 See `The Algiers Accords'  Department of State Bulletin, (February 1981), pp. 1-15, also in (1981) 20 International 
Legal Materials, p. 23. Under the accords, the Iranian assets that stood on the books of the overseas branches of the US 
banks together with interest payments, were to be transferred into an escrow account with the Bank of England. This 
account was to be in the name of the Algerian Central Bank. The funds were then to be released to Iran upon the safe 
departure of the hostages.
59.
 See Exec. Order No. 12, 544, (1986), 51 Fed. Reg., 1,235, (1987) 3 C.F.R., para. 183, reprinted 50 U.S.C.A., para. 
1701. The Order imposed a freeze on all Libyan government owned property in the US, or “within the possession or 
control of US persons, including overseas branches of US persons.” There was also another executive order issued by 
the president before this one. Under this first executive order, all imports into the United States of goods of Libyan 
origin and exports of goods to Libya, were prohibited. Also prohibited by this first executive order was the provision of 
credit by US persons to Libya. See Exec. Order No. 12, 543 (1986) 51 Fed. Reg., p. 875.
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a bank wholly owned by the Central Bank of Libya, had a substantial amount of funds 
on deposit with Bankers Trust Co., a US bank, in London and in New York.  
 The relationship between Libya Arab Foreign Bank and Bankers Trust Co. 
began in July 1972, when Libya Arab Foreign Bank appointed Bankers Trust Co. of 
New York as its correspondent bank on a reciprocal basis.60 Libya Arab Foreign Bank 
later opened a eurodollar account with Bankers Trust Co. in Paris that same year. In 
April 1973, Libya Arab Foreign Bank opened a 7-day notice account with Bankers 
Trust Co. in London into which it transferred the balance of the Paris account that it 
had closed.61 In December 1973, Libya Arab Foreign Bank also closed its Bankers 
Trust Co. - New York Account and transferred the balance to its Bankers Trust Co.-
London account.62 The eurodollar account that Libya Arab Foreign Bank held with 
Bankers Trust in London was an interest bearing account which was used for its day 
to day operations as well as for investment purposes.63 In November 1977, Bankers 
Trust Co. became dissatisfied with the profit earning potential of the London account 
and operating difficulties. Bankers Trust Co. therefore proposed the use of a 
“managed account system” to manage the affairs of Libya Arab Foreign Bank. This 
comprised a current account to be maintained at Bankers Trust Co.-New York and a 
call account to be maintained at Bankers Trust Co.-London.  
 An agreement was reached in December 1980 under which Libya Arab Foreign 
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Bank would open a demand account in New York with a minimum balance of 
$500,000 and a call account in London. The Bankers Trust Co. -New York account 
was to be a non-interest bearing account and the daily account operations of Libya 
Arab Foreign Bank were shifted to New York. Under this managed account system, all 
transactions were to pass through New York. Pursuant to this, Bankers Trust installed 
a cash connector in the Libya office of Libya Arab Foreign Bank that enabled the latter 
to have direct access to computerized accounts held in Bankers Trust Co.-New York. 
All credit and debit instructions were to be sent via this cash connector to Bankers 
Trust Co.-New York where the transactions would be effected.64 Under the 
agreement, at 9am each banking day, Bankers Trust Co. was required to determine 
the closing balance for the previous day with respect to the New York account. When 
the balance was in excess of $500,000, the excess was to be transferred to the 
London account. The transfer was to be in such multiples of $100,000 as would leave 
a maximum balance of $599,000 in the New York account.65 If the balance in the New 
York account fell below $500,000, it was agreed that a compensating transfer was to 
be made from the London account.  
 Two days before the imposition of the US freeze order, Bankers Trust Co. failed 
to transfer funds from New York to the London account pursuant to the managed 
account arrangement. At the time of the freeze order on January 8th, 1986, the 
balance in the London account was $131 million and the balance in the New York 
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account, was $161 million in excess of the stipulated $500,000 maximum balance. 
 After the freeze was imposed, Libya Arab Foreign Bank made various attempts 
to secure repayment. First, on the 28th April, 1986, it sent a telex to Bankers Trust 
Co.-London demanding repayment of the balance.66 A similar telex was also sent to 
Bankers Trust Co.-New York demanding payment of the $161 million that had been 
frozen in New York. Bankers Trust Co., in response, sent a telex refusing both 
demands for payment.67 
Libya Arab Foreign Bank therefore commenced legal action against Bankers 
Trust Co. in the high court in London claiming, among other things (1) payment of 
the $131 million from the London account (2) payment of the $161 million from the 
US account which should have been transferred before the freeze, (3) payment of an 
amount of $1.8 million representing the back values of transfers from the New York 
account to the London account which Bankers Trust Co., between April 1984 and 
October 1986 had failed to effect and (4) damages for non-payment of its payment 
instructions. 
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Bankers Trust Co., drawing a distinction between the repayment obligation in a 
domestic banking context and in a eurobanking context, advanced the argument that 
Libya Arab Foreign Bank could not demand payment in London because it was an 
express term of the arrangements with Libya Arab Foreign Bank that all payments 
would go through New York, because the nature of the repayment process of the 
eurodollar transaction required the performance of acts in New York, namely the use 
of the clearing and settlement process in New York.  Such acts would be illegal 
pursuant to the freeze order. 
 At first instance, Evans J. observed that the correspondence which had taken 
place between Libya Arab Foreign Bank and Bankers Trust Co, in which it had been 
agreed to pass all transactions through the New York account, was nothing more than 
an agreement to pass transactions through New York. By merely agreeing to pass 
funds through New York, Libya Arab Foreign Bank had not waived its right to deal 
with the London branch.68 In the eyes of the court, the 1980 agreement was only 
concerned with three things: (1) the opening of the demand account in New York, (2) 
the setting up of the managed account procedures and (3) the variation of the notice 
period for the London account. Based on this observation, Mr Justice Evans saw no 
need to imply a term into the contract to the effect that Libya Arab Foreign Bank 
could no longer exercise its rights over the London account.69 
Mr Justice Evans also held that although the dollar obligations which took place 
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in London were settled in the New York clearing system, this did not make New York 
the place of performance of the obligation of Bankers Trust Co. This was because the 
telex sent by Libya Arab Foreign Bank had clearly stated that payment was to be 
made in London, in cash.  
 This argument of the court seems to suggest that in the absence of any 
express stipulation in the form of a telex or any other documentation which varies a 
eurocurrency deposit contract, the place of settlement and clearing of the currency 
concerned would be the place of performance. The law of that place would then 
govern the performance of the payment obligation. In this respect, the argument of 
the court appears to make a hole in the traditional common law approach regarding 
the place of repayment. The place of repayment is seen as not being absolute, but is 
rather dependent the facts of the case. Where there is some stipulation in the 
contract that some other place, and not the place where the account is kept is the 
place of repayment, then that stipulation will apply.  According to the Court, however, 
since the place of repayment, as stated in the telex, was London, the place of 
ultimate settlement was irrelevant and there was no need for the court to make a 
choice between the traditional common law approach and the eurobanking approach. 
Consequently, the court held that the argument of Bankers Trust Co. that payment 
would be illegal had no basis.70 
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On October 16th, 1986, Mr Justice Evans in the high court granted summary 
judgement in favour of Libya Arab Foreign Bank. He stated that although his decision 
might lead to Bankers Trust Co. suffering penalties in the US, his duty was to enforce 
the law of the United Kingdom as he saw it to be.  Bankers Trust Co. appealed the 
decision on the grounds that it should have been given unconditional leave to defend. 
In view of some important observations made by the Court of Appeal,71 it is 
instructive to consider the decision of that court. 
Mr Justice Kerr in giving the opinion of the Court of Appeal stated that the 
issues to be decided were as follows: (1) whether the London account was a 
eurodollar account and if so (2) what the obligations of the parties were with respect 
to that account. In particular, the court was concerned with determining (1) if the 
alleged practice that eurodollar transactions were cleared in the United States and 
made available there, amounted to a legally recognized usage and if not (2) whether 
Libya Arab Foreign Bank could demand payment in the manner it had requested. The 
other issue to be determined was (3) the proper law governing the London account.  
The court stated that Bankers Trust Co. could only rely on the presidential orders as a 
defence if either US law was the law governing the contractual relationship with 
regards to the London account or compliance with the demand for repayment 
required some act in New York which would be illegal there. 
 As the court of appeal saw it, the facts of the case revealed strong arguable 
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issues that could only be decided at an ordinary trial. As Kerr L.J. observed, what 
Evans J., in awarding summary judgement had done, was conduct a “trial by 
affidavit” alone.72 For example, on the issue of whether the London account was a 
eurodollar account and if so what the obligations of the parties were, the court of 
appeal held that Mr Justice Evans had based his decision on the premise that  a bank 
account is located solely at the branch where it is kept. This made Evans J. conclude, 
that Libya Arab Foreign Bank could only make a demand for payment and in 
particular, payment in cash at that branch.73 For Kerr L.J., however, the rule that a 
bank account is payable at the branch, probably only applied to bank accounts 
denominated in local currency, and not large amounts of foreign currency.74 Kerr J. 
therefore considered the possibility that the common law place of repayment rule, 
while being applicable to accounts denominated in the currency of the jurisdiction 
where the bank is located, was inapplicable to foreign currency deposits.  
 Mustill L.J. also observed, that it was very possible that the eurocurrency 
market had developed special customs and practices which made eurocurrency 
accounts different from ordinary accounts and which the court had to recognize. 
However, since this could only be decided after a full trial, the defendants, Bankers 
Trust Co., were allowed their appeal and given unconditional leave to defend the 
case. On remand the case came before Mr Justice Staughton of the commercial court. 
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The argument advanced by Libya Arab Foreign Bank on remand varied only 
slightly from that advanced earlier. The most important of these claims, which is also 
the focus of this section, was the first claim for $131 million in the account in London.  
At the basis of this claim was the general issue of the nature of the London account - 
whether it could be called a eurodollar account - and rights and obligations of the 
parties with respect to that account.  
 This first claim of Libya Arab Foreign Bank for the $131 million in the London 
account was based on four basic propositions of the common law approach to the 
ordinary banker-customer relationship. These propositions are as follows: (1) the 
relationship between the banker and customer is that of debtor and creditor; (2) the 
bank is liable to pay the money owed the customer, on demand; (3) the customer is 
entitled to demand to be paid in legal tender and (4) the customer has to make the 
demand at the branch where the account is kept. When these propositions are 
applied to the obligations of the parties with respect to the case at bar, it meant that 
(1) Bankers Trust Co. was the debtor of Libya Arab Foreign Bank, (2) Bankers Trust 
Co. had to pay the money it owed Libya Arab Foreign Bank on demand, a valid 
demand had been made by telex, (3) Libya Arab Foreign Bank was entitled to be paid 
in legal tender, hence the demand by telex to be paid in cash was valid and (4) Libya 
Arab Foreign Bank had to make demand at the branch where the account was kept, 
which was London. Libya Arab Foreign Bank consequently argued that there was only 
one contract and it was governed by English law. Alternatively, there were two 
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contracts with two proper laws. The contract with respect  to the New York account 
was governed by New York law and the contract with respect to the London account 
remained governed by English law.75 
The defendants, Bankers Trust Co., argued that the London account was a 
eurodollar account and was therefore subject to rules that were different from those 
applied in the ordinary banker-customer relationship. It also argued that after 1980 
with the creation of the new account, the nature of the relationship changed: a new 
contract was created. After 1980, although there were two accounts in existence - 
the New York and London accounts - there was only one contract, and it was 
governed by US law. This was because it had expressly been agreed between 
Bankers Trust Co. and Libya Arab Foreign Bank that all transactions would pass 
through New York. Since Libya Arab Foreign Bank had expressly agreed to the 
management of its accounts from New York, it was neither entitled to make a 
demand for payment in London, nor receive payment there. The corollary of this 
argument was that even if there had been no freeze order, it would still have been 
contrary to the terms of the contract for Libya Arab Foreign Bank to demand payment 
in London. Since the freeze order had made it illegal to effect payments in New York, 
payment, under any circumstances, could not be made. 
 This argument in defence therefore focused not so much on the legality or 
otherwise of the extraterritorial application of the freeze order, but on the nature of 
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the contractual obligation itself which, it was argued, was expressly governed by US 
law. 
 Bankers Trust Co. also argued that apart from the express term of the 
contract, there was also an implied term that the transfer of funds from London to 
New York would be made by way of a US clearing system, to the credit of an account 
with a bank in the US. Such a bank or branch of a bank would be nominated By Libya 
Arab Foreign Bank. In other words, because of the nature of the usage of the 
eurodollar market and the course of dealing between the parties,76 there was an 
implied term that in effecting transfers from London to New York, only CHIPS or 
Fedwire would be employed. 
 In arriving at a decision, Mr Justice Staughton first considered the issue 
concerning the conflict of laws. Both Bankers Trust Co. and Libya Arab Foreign Bank 
did not dispute the general rule that had to be applied. According to the principles 
governing the choice of law in contracts with foreign elements, performance of a 
contract is excused if (1) it has become illegal by the proper law of the contract or (2) 
it necessarily involves doing an act that is illegal in the place of performance.77 The 
court, as a threshold issue, then had to determine the proper law that governed the 
London contract after 1980. 
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(b) The problem of the proper law 
As discussed above, the place where the account is kept, under the common 
law, is also the place of repayment. This approach is based on the notion that money 
on deposit is specie and has a particular location or situs. In the common law, the 
proper law of the traditional banker customer deposit contract, is said to be the law of 
the place where the account is kept. This rule is based on the link between the place 
where the account is kept and the place of repayment in the traditional domestic 
context. However when this rule is applied to the Eurocurrency context, problems 
arise. This is because the place where the eurocurrecy deposit account is kept is not 
the usual place of repayment.  
 In Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust, the Court was of the opinion that 
this traditional rule was applicable to the eurocurrency context. Staughton J. held that 
one had to start from the first principle that in the absence of agreement to the 
contrary, the contract between banker and customer is governed by the law of the 
place where the account is kept. The problem was therefore to determine the place 
where the London account was kept. Although he observed that it was difficult to 
apply the analogy of an account being kept at a specific place to the case at bar,78 he 
nevertheless went on to conclude, that since the actual entries on the London account 
were made in London, the London account was at all material times kept in London. 
There were thus either two separate contracts or one contract with two proper laws. 
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Staughton J. however preferred the idea of one contract governed in part by the law 
of New York and the law of England.79 But as far as the obligations of the parties 
concerning the London account were concerned, Staughton J. held that English law 
governed.80 
Unlike the observation of Kerr L.J. in the court of appeal, then,  Staughton J. 
held that it would require overwhelming evidence before it could be asserted that the 
general principles with respect to the choice of law rules in the banker-customer 
relationship did not apply to the eurocurrency deposit relationship. For Staughton J. 
then, the link between the place where the account is kept and the place of 
repayment (which is at the basis of the proper law rule), was applicable to the 
eurocurrency deposit in the case at bar. In other words, the place where the account 
was kept in the eurocurrency deposit operation, London, was the same as the place 
where repayment of the deposit was to take place.  
 
(c) The form of payment 
 Another issue that arose in the case was the form of payment. As explained 
earlier, since the common law considers money on deposit to be specie, unless an 
agreement to the contrary exists, the depositor is entitled to be repaid in specie. This 
is problematic in the eurobanking context, first because the bank where the account 
is kept does not have access to specie, and the account is in the form of book entries 
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only. The Court in Libya Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers’ Trust, went on to consider the 
kind of payment that Libya Arab Foreign Bank was entitled to demand, which would 
not necessarily involve an illegal act in the US. 
 The primary line of defence of Bankers Trust Co. was that there was an 
express term in the contract after 1980 that mandated that payment be effected via 
New York. If there were such an express term, Libya Arab Foreign Bank would not be 
entitled to demand payment in London and payment would have to pass through New 
York. In this event payment would also be illegal. However, Mr Justice Staughton held 
that the managed account arrangement together with its express term had been 
terminated by the telex sent by Libya Arab Foreign Bank demanding payment. After 
this termination, Libya Arab Foreign Bank was within its rights to demand payment in 
London. Having resolved the issue of whether there was an express term concerning 
payment in New York, it was then necessary to determine if there was an implied 
term as advanced by Bankers Trust Co. The essence of Bankers Trust Co.'s defense 
based on the implied term was that payment of eurodollars necessarily involved a 
clearing system in the US. This procedure - according to Bankers Trust Co. - was an 
integral part of the operation of eurocurrency deposits and was based on the fact that 
the dollars - which were the subject matter of the contract - were not available in 
England. Consequently, it would be impossible to effect payment in legal tender in 
London. Unlike a sterling deposit and deposits of small quantities of foreign currency 
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then, Bankers Trust Co. had no direct access to wholesale deposits of eurodollars, 
which were nothing more than book entries. This also meant that the parties could 
not have envisaged cash as a means of payment. In support of this position, Bankers 
Trust Co. submitted in evidence the written expert report of Dr Marcia Stigum. The 
report of Dr Marcia Stigum stated among other things that cash transactions are an 
insignificant part of the eurocurrency market and that the market is strictly a non-
cash market.81 Mr Justice Staughton, after considering the evidence, observed that 
Bankers Trust Co. had failed to establish the existence of a usage in the market as 
well as a course of dealing between Libya Arab Foreign Bank And Bankers Trust Co., 
which would justify implying a term that payment had to be made in New York, via 
the New York payments and clearing system. He nevertheless made it clear that it 
was possible that such a usage could be established as regards time deposits that 
were traded between the dealing rooms of banks. This was not so with the case at 
bar.  
 Having rejected the existence of such a usage, the court held that Libya Arab 
Foreign Bank was entitled to payment in legal tender or cash (either dollars or 
sterling).82 It was the opinion of Staughton J. that apart from the problem of security 
and counting, there was no formidable difficulty in Bankers Trust Co. obtaining the 
equivalent of $131 million in sterling notes from the Bank of England. Bankers Trust 
Co. obtaining dollar bills would also pose no problems and in the view of the court, 
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the delivery of dollars from New York would not constitute performance per se, but 
merely preparation for performance.83 
Thus in this major decision by a court, involving the deposit side of the 
eurocurrency market, the common law rules regarding the banker-customer 
relationship were considered applicable to eurocurrency deposits without any 
modification or reformulation.  
 The decision leaves many questions unanswered. The court argued that there 
was no implied or express term in the deposit agreement that required payment to be 
effected in New York. In particular, the court did not consider the method and place 
of repaying large dollar deposits to constitute a usage. This implied that repayment of 
the eurocurrency deposit in the case at bar, had to take place in London, although the 
bank did not have access to such large amounts of foreign currency. Indeed the court 
did not consider it relevant to give any consideration to the nature of the clearing 
system. The conclusion that may be derived from this case is, that since - according 
to common law principles - a depositor of local currency has a right to demand 
repayment in cash, a customer depositing foreign currency also has a right to be 
repaid in cash (irrespective of the quantity involved) in addition to other forms of 
payment.84 
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Justice Staughton’s observations reveal that the traditional proper law rule 
concerning deposit contracts may not be directly applicable to eurocurrency deposits. 
The observation that in some cases it may be possible to establish the existence of a 
usage concerning the repayment of eurocurrencies via the country of issue, suggests 
that the traditional approach may be modified. This is because since the proper law 
rule is based on the common law link between the place where the account is kept 
and the place of repayment, in those situations where the place of repayment is 
different from the place where the account entries are made, the basis for the rule 
collapses.  
 It is submitted, on the basis of the above analysis, that there is the need for a 
re-evaluation of the common law regarding the payment obligation of banks. The 
common law must take into consideration the modern reality. In this day and age of 
eurocurrency deposits and placement operations where an account is opened without 
the deposit or transfer of actual specie, the prevailing practice suggests the existence 
of an implied term that payment is made not where the account is maintained but in 
the country of issue of the currency concerned. Regretfully, the court in Libya Arab 
Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co.85 missed a good opportunity to rethink the archaic 
common law approach to the banker customer relationship. For the court to say that 
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in the absence of a statement to the contrary, a depositor of foreign currency of 
whatever amount has a right to demand payment in cash, because “every monetary 
obligation is to be fulfilled by the delivery of cash,”86 is not in accordance with the 
reality.  
 
(ii) The funds transfer relationship between eurobank and customer 
 The second stage in the relationship between the eurobank and the customer 
arises when the customer gives the eurobank a mandate to effect a transfer of funds. 
In the search for legal rules to govern funds transfers, courts have in the past relied 
on analogies from the common law rules regarding the collection and payment of 
cheques and other bills of exchange. One of these analogies concerns the law of 
agency as it applies to the collection and payment of bills of exchange.  
 In the ordinary common law banker customer relationship, it is generally 
accepted, that although the general character of the banker-customer relationship is 
that of a contract, this legal character is modified and becomes one of agency when 
the bank undertakes certain transactions on behalf of its customer.87 When the bank 
obtains a mandate from the customer to effect a transfer of funds from one ordinary 
account to another, the contractual relationship is modified and becomes one of 
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agency. The reason is that in both credit and debit transfers,88 as in the case of 
collecting negotiable instruments and effecting payment via the cheque clearing 
process, the bank is acting in a representative capacity on the instructions of its 
customer.89 The customer is the principal in this agency relationship and the bank 
transferring the funds - the transmitting or originating bank - is the agent.  
 While it is generally accepted that the above common law principles also apply 
in the eurobaking context, the courts have drawn a distinction between on the one 
hand, the process of transferring funds, which gives rise to a relationship of agency, 
and on the other, the instruction to transfer funds from the customer which does not 
give rise to any legal relationship. This distinction was drawn in Royal Products v. 
Midland Bank.90 
Royal Products, the Plaintiff, was a company that carried out its operations in 
Malta, and maintained bank accounts with Midland Bank in England, and National 
Bank and Bank of Industry Commerce and Agriculture (“BICAL”) both in Malta. In 
November 1972, Royal Products wanted to transfer funds from its account with 
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Midland Bank in England to National Bank in Malta. If the transfer was effected 
directly, Royal Products would have had to pay certain high fees. Royal Products thus 
decided not to transfer the funds to National Bank, but rather to transfer the funds to 
BICAL and it instructed Midland Bank to transfer the funds to BICAL. Midland Bank, 
which had a correspondent relationship with National Bank in Malta, had on previous 
occasions arranged such a transfer directly with BICAL. However, on this occasion 
Midland Bank decided to effect the transfer through its correspondent relationship 
with National Bank. Midland thus instructed National Bank to transfer the requested 
funds from its vostro account to the account of Royal Products at BICAL. This 
instruction was given by telex. National Bank only became aware of the telex the 
following day, November 24. On that day, instead of immediately effecting the 
transfer, National Bank opened an internal suspense account in the name of BICAL 
and credited this account. The funds were transferred later. The following day BICAL 
ceased operations and the Central Bank of Malta took over its operations. 
 On November 27, upon determining that BICAL had ceased operating, Royal 
Products asked Midland Bank to amend the funds transfer instruction and not to 
transfer funds to BICAL but to National Bank. Following these instructions, Midland 
Bank instructed National Bank to retrieve the original remittance. National Bank 
advised Midland Bank that the transfer had already been effected on November 25 
and that it could not be retrieved because BICAL was now under the control of the 
Central Bank of Malta which had imposed restrictions on BICAL’s operations. Midland 
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Bank informed Royal Products of the situation and Royal Products commenced an 
action in England against Midland Bank.    
 Royal Products argued that (a) they were entitled to be reimbursed their 
money because their instructions were never carried out; (b) Midland Bank owed it a 
duty in carrying out the funds transfer instructions and were in breach of this duty; 
and (c) National Bank, the third party, and Royal Products had a contractual 
relationship and National Bank should have effected the transfer on the date that it 
received the order. 
 In determining whether Royal Products could recover its funds, the Court made 
certain statements respecting the legal character of the funds transfer order and the 
nature of the legal relationship that arises when a funds transfer order is given. 
According to the Court, a funds transfer order is nothing more than a mere instruction 
from the customer to the bank to effect a transfer. While the process of effecting the 
transfer could give rise to a legal relationship, such as an agency relationship, the 
transfer order itself did not give rise to any relationship between Royal Products and 
Midland Bank. 
 The Court held further, that Midland owed a duty to use care in carrying out 
the transfer and could be held to be vicariously liable for the conduct of its agents. 
However, the funds transfer instruction did not create any additional obligation on 
Midland Bank. The instruction merely required that Midland Bank effect a transfer, it 
did not preclude it from employing a specific method of transfer. Finally, the court 
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also held that there was nothing in the instructions to effect the transfer that created 
privity of contract between Royal Products and the subagent, National Bank.  
 The decision exposes an inconsistency between, on the one hand, the 
traditional common law approach as laid down by Atkin L.J. in Joachimson v. Swiss 
Bank, and the relationship between a bank and its customer in the domestic context, 
and on the other hand, the relationship in the eurobanking context. In the domestic 
context banks are frequently required by clients to undertake certain activities, 
including crediting the account of other customers at the same bank or at other 
banks. The decision in Joachimson v. Swiss Bank makes it clear that the relationship 
between a bank and its customer is contractual. As part of the contract there is an 
obligation on the customer to “exercise reasonable care in executing written orders so 
as not to mislead the bank ---“. The reason for this is that the written order or 
instruction binds the bank and it must act on the written order. The decision in Royal 
Products suggests, however, that when the customer gives a bank an instruction, for 
example to credit the account of another customer, that instruction does not give rise 
to any legal relationship between the bank and the customer. In the eurobanking 
context then, a distinction is drawn between the funds transfer instruction, and the 
process of effecting the transfer. If there is any legal relationship, it arises only at the 
time that the eurobank proceeds to effect the transfer and not before.  
 Conceptually, it is difficult to see how one is able to sever the instruction of the 
customer from the totality of the contractual relationship that underpins the banker 
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customer relationship, so that one is able to make the argument that the instruction 
of a customer to its bank, gives rise to no legal relationship. The decision clearly 
creates a need for clarity in the common law on the banker customer relationship.       
 
(a)  Duties of the Originating Bank as an Agent 
 The relationship of agency in the credit transfer process imposes certain duties 
on the transmitting/originating bank. One of the most important duties that the 
transmitting bank owes to the customer is a duty to exercise care and skill in the 
process of transferring the funds. It is generally accepted that the standard that is 
imposed on the transmitting bank is the standard which is expected of a bank 
engaged in that business, according to current banking standards. This duty of care 
and skill may be divided into three facets: (1) the transferring bank must act in 
accordance with the mandate of its customer, (2) the transferring bank is obliged to 
employ the services of a reliable correspondent bank to effect the transfer where this 
is needed, and (3) the transferring bank must effect a timely transfer of the funds 
concerned.91 This duty of care and skill is owed only to the sending customer and not 
to a stranger,92 or the payee. The only time where an originating or paying bank will 
 
91.
 In  the absence of a contractual disclaimer, the originating bank is held to be vicariously liable for the negligence or 
default of its correspondents. The authority for this proposition is Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Dawson & 
Partners (1926), 27 Ll. L. Rep. 49 (H.L.).
92.
 This  is especially relevant in those situations where the originating bank accepts a transfer order from a stranger, 
pursuant to an arrangement between the beneficiary bank and the originating bank that is intended to benefit the 
beneficiary or payee. The possibility of a stranger using a bank to effect a credit transfer to a payee at another bank, is 
very likely in England where, after the Golden Memorandum of 1967, a person is able to effect payments into the 
account of another from any bank in the U.K. under the Giro system.
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owe a duty to a payee is where the paying bank is also a receiving bank. In this 
context, the bank owes a duty in its capacity as a receiving bank. However, the case 
of Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd.93 suggests that a paying or originating bank 
may owe a duty to a payee not only because it is aso a receiving bank, but also 
because it assumed or took upon itself the responsibility of effecting the transfer on 
behalf of the payee. The case stands for the proposition that if a party assumes the 
responsibility of performing a task on behalf of another, then that party is liable in the 
event that its act or omissions result in damage to the other party.  
 
1.  The duty to act in accordance with the customer's mandate 
Under the law of agency, an agent is required to comply strictly with the 
instructions of its principal. This has been determined to mean that where the agent 
exceeds its authority or does not follow the mandate of its principal to the letter, the 
agent will not receive any reimbursement.94 This is so even if the result of exceeding 
or going contrary to the principal's instructions is not detrimental to the principal. The 
corollary of this rule is that the principal's instructions, in this case the customer's 
instructions to the transferring bank, have to be unambiguous and clear. It has been 
held in some cases that where the mandate of the principal is ambiguous, the agent 
may use the ambiguity to justify its construction of the instructions.95 
93 [1995] 2 A.C. 145. See also White v. Jones [1995] 2 A.C. 207.
94.
 See Midland Bank Ltd. v. Seymour,[1955] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 147 p. 168, Per Devlin J. 
95.
 See Ireland v. Livingston (1872), L.R. 5 H.L. 394; European Asian Bank A.G. v. Punjab & Sind Bank (No. 2),[1983] 
1 W.L.R. 642,  p. 656, per Goff L.J.
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In the context of funds transfers, the originating or transmitting bank is under 
a duty to act in accordance with the customer's mandate. Failing to act in accordance 
with the customer's mandate is the general expression that encompasses a variety of 
situations in which the transferring bank effects an incorrect transfer. This includes 
effecting a transfer to the wrong payee or beneficiary, including the situation where 
no transfer is authorized, and effecting a transfer to the correct payee, but in the 
wrong amount.  
 The current position seems to be that the rule regarding strict compliance by 
an agent with the instructions of its principal, is modified in the funds transfer 
context. In Royal Products v. Midland Bank,96 it was held that a transferring bank will 
not be held to be in breach of its mandate if, in following the instructions, it acts in 
accordance with the skill and manner generally accepted in the business of banking.97 
(b)  The duty to engage a reliable correspondent bank 
 According to the law of agency, an agent may neither delegate its authority nor 
appoint a sub-agent to undertake any transaction on behalf of the principal, without 
the express or implied authority of the principal.98 Prima facie, then, the transmitting 
(originating) bank, without the authority of the customer, may not engage any other 
bank to assist it in effecting the transfer. This general rule poses problems in those 
 
96.
 Supra, note 90.
97.
 Ibid., p. 199, per Webster J.
98. De Bussche v. Alt (1878), 8 Ch. D 286.
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situations where the beneficiary-payee of a funds transfer order maintains an account 
at another bank with which the transmitting (originating) bank does not have a 
correspondent account. Where a beneficiary-payee of a funds transfer order 
maintains an account at either (1) a bank with which the transmitting (originating) 
bank has a correspondent relationship, or (2) another branch of the transmitting 
(originating) bank, then a direct transfer is possible. However in those situations 
where neither of the above account arrangements exist, there is the need for an 
intermediary bank. The position seems to be that where there is the need to employ 
the services of a correspondent sub-agent, the transmitting (originating) bank will be 
deemed to have the implied authority of its customer-principal to appoint the 
correspondent bank as its sub-agent for the purposes of effecting the transfer.99 This 
is so for two reasons. First, the nature of the transaction is such that it cannot be 
carried out without the appointment of a sub-agent. This being so, it is possible to 
argue that the customer-principal intended that the transmitting (originating) bank 
should be able to delegate its authority.100 Also, the employment of a sub-agent to 
assist the transmitting (originating) bank in effecting the transfer of funds is justified 
by the customs and usage of the eurocurrency market.  
 
99. Quebec & Rochmond Railroad Co. v. Quinn(1858), 12 Moo. P.C. 232 and see Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. 
Dawson & Partners (1926), 25 Lloyd's Rep. 90.
100. De Bussche v. Alt, supra, note 19.
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II. The relationship between the transmitting originating bank and 
the correspondent bank 
 
Since the correspondent bank acts on the instructions of the transmitting 
(originating) bank, it is the agent of that bank. The rules discussed above, regarding 
the duties of skill and care of an agent, are also applicable here. The correspondent 
bank is under a duty to act in accordance with the mandate that is given to it by its 
principal, the transmitting (originating) bank, and to use such skill and care as would 
be expected of a comparable bank in such a situation. 
 
III. The relationship between the payor/sending customer  
 and the correspondent bank. 
Regarding the relationship between the customer who initiates the funds 
transfer, and the intermediary correspondent bank, the general rule is that delegation 
does not create privity of contract between the principal and the sub-agent. Thus, so 
far as the issue of rights and liabilities is concerned, the payor (the principal) may 
only sue and be sued by the transferring-originating bank (the agent). Likewise, the 
sub-agent, the correspondent bank may only sue and be sued by the agent-
transmitting (originating) bank.101 
101. Calico Printers Association v. Barclays Bank(1931), 145 L.T. 51; Schmaling v. Tonlinson (1815), 6 Taunt 147.
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This situation, where the transmitting (originating) bank delegates its authority 
to another intermediary bank because the nature of the transaction warrants it, 
needs to be differentiated from those situations where (1) a customer may employ a 
bank specifically for the purposes of creating an agency relationship between it and a 
third party, and (2) the agent undertakes to provide the customer with another agent 
as a substitute for itself. In these two situations, the customer's bank, in reality 
becomes functus officio when the third party is appointed an agent. In general then, 
whether privity of contract exists between the customer who initiates the funds 
transfer and the intermediary bank which is employed by the customer's bank to 
effect the transfer, will depend on the circumstances of the case and the intention of 
the customer - the principal. There are two U.S. cases which illustrate this exception 
to the general rule regarding privity, namely, Silverstein v. Chartered Bank,102 and 
Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank.103 
In Silverstein, the U.S. court was of the opinion that there was privity of 
contract between the payor-customer and the bank's correspondent because the 
correspondent had been expressly requested by the customer.  
 Evra Corp., involved an Illinois corporation, Evra Corp.,  that was engaged in 
shipping and the purchase and sale scrap metal. Evra Corp. entered into a Charter 
under which it was required to pay approximately US$1,825 per day as rent. The ship 
was to be used by Evra Corp. to deliver scrap metal to fulfil a prior contract with a 
 
102.
 392 N.Y.S. (2d) 296 (1977), hereinafter Silverstein.
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Brazilian corporation. The Charter provided that iif Evra Corp. failed to make payment 
on time, the owner could withdraw the vessel. Payment was to be made by wire 
transfer through an Illinois bank, the Continental Illinois National Bank. Continental, 
to the Swiss account of the owners at Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (Suisse). To 
effect this transfer, Continental Illinois National Bank used Swiss Bank as its 
correspondent bank. For one payment, following a request from Evra Corp., 
Continental Illinois Bank sent a funds transfer order to its London branch for 
transmittal to Swiss Bank in Geneva. A telex operator at the London branch of 
Continental Illinois National Bank tried to  reach Swiss Bank’s general telex  to 
provide it with the funds transfer instructions but did not succeed. The telex operator 
then sent another message to another telex number at Swiss Bank and received a 
confirmation that the message had been received. Unbeknownst to the telex 
operator, there was no paper in the telex machine to which the message had been 
sent although the machine continued to receive messages. Consequently, Swiss Bank 
did not act on the funds transfer message and the funds were not paid into the 
account of the ship owners at the required time. The owners withdrew the Charter 
and Evra Corp. sued Swiss Bank alleging that Swiss Bank had breached its contract 
with it. Swiss Bank in defence argued that it owed no duty to Evra Corp. as it was a 
merely a correspondent bank and an agent of Continental Illinois National Bank. The 
Court held that Swiss Bank was liable to pay damages for breach of contract and 
 
103.
 522 F. Supp. 820 (1981); rev'd on other grounds 673 F. 2d 951 (1982), hereinafter Evra Corp.
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negligence and that there was privity of contract between Evra Corp. and Swiss Bank. 
Although the decision was overturned, the decision on appeal turned on the issue of 
consequential damages. The dictum of the lower court with respect to privity between 
Evra Corp. and Swiss Bank was not discussed on appeal. 
 Thus, if the circumstances of a case suggest that the customer's bank was 
authorized to find a bank that would effect a transfer, as opposed to effecting the 
transfer itself with the aid of an intermediary bank, there will be privity of contract 
between the customer and the intermediary bank which is employed by the 
customer's bank. However, if the customer initiating the funds transfer authorized the 
bank to effect a transfer, and the bank employed the services of a correspondent 
bank to do so, the exception to the rule regarding privity will not apply. In general 
however, since most eurocurrency transactions are effected by the means of 
correspondent banks which are employed by other banks to effect transfers, the 
general common law rule which leans against finding privity of contract will apply. 
 It is possible to argue that the above cases have not really altered the general 
rule with regards to privity of contract because they were decided on peculiar facts. 
For instance, it is possible to argue that in Silverstein, by expressly requesting a 
correspondent bank, the customer had impliedly requested its bank to create an 
agency relationship between it and the correspondent bank. In other words, by 
expressly selecting the correspondent bank, the transferor had taken away from its 
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bank one of the attributes that would have made it a principal: the ability to choose 
and employ an agent. 
 Although the decision in Evra Corp. is more difficult to justify, it is possible to 
argue that the U.S. District Court found privity of contract because of its reliance on 
Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court held that under the common law 
of the U.S., there was privity of contract between a principal and its sub-agent. 
 It is possible to argue on the basis of the current state of the law, that as a 
general rule, the correspondent will not be held liable for breach of contract vis-a-vis 
the initiating customer if it is shown that (a) the transferring bank was authorized to 
effect the transfer and not to create an agency relationship between the 
correspondent bank and its customer, (b) the transferring bank engaged the 
correspondent bank, on its own initiative to assist it in effecting the transfer, and (c) 
the transferring bank has not undertaken to provide the customer with another agent 
as a substitute to itself. 
 
(i) Can the correspondent bank be liable in tort? 
 Although it is generally accepted that the transferring bank will be held liable 
for the negligence or default of its agent, the liability of the correspondent bank in 
tort to the initiating customer is not at all certain. It has been argued, on the basis of 
an analogy with the law of bailment, that a correspondent bank can be held liable in 
tort to the customer of a transferring bank. 
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According to this approach, in the law of bailment, if "X" bails goods to "Y", 
who then makes a bailment of the goods to "Z", "Z" will be held liable for the loss or 
destruction of the goods.104 However, it is not at all clear if this principle in the law of 
bailment can be applied to the law of agency. In Balgamo v. Medeci,105 an attempt to 
apply the approach to the law of agency failed. Walton J., in addition to holding that 
the principal could not sue the sub-agent in contract because there was no privity, 
also held that because there was no duty owed by the sub-agent to the principal, no 
action could be maintained in tort. Consequently, the only right of action was in 
contract against the agent. This case may not be as decisive a determinant of the 
issue as it seems for various reasons. First, the reason why the principal could not 
sue the sub-agent in tort appears to have been procedural. The sub-agent was not 
named and served as a third party. Also it seems too broad a statement to state that 
no duty of care arises between the correspondent bank, which is a sub-agent, and 
the customer who initiates the transfer. The argument may be made that the 
customer is a person who the correspondent bank should foresee as likely to be 
affected by its acts and omissions if it does not exercise due care. Thus a duty of care 
arises in this sense.  
 It has also been argued that correspondent bank is too remote a potential 
tortfeasor to be sued in tort. However, this argument is without any foundation in 
law. The issue of proximity in tort law is with regard to the injured party and not the 
 
104.
 See Lee Cooper Ltd. v. C.H. Jenkins & Sons Ltd.,[1967] 2 Q.B.; Learoyd Bros & Co. v. Pope & Sons Ltd.,[1968] 1 
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tortfeasor. It is definitely certain, that a customer is a party who is reasonably 
foreseeable by the correspondent bank. Consequently, an action in negligence may 
be brought against it.   
 
IV. The relationship between the receiving/destination bank and the 
beneficiary-customer 
 
The existing case law suggests that when a receiving/beneficiary bank receives 
funds on behalf of its customer, the payee or beneficiary, it does so as an agent of 
such a customer. In The Laconia, Denning M.R. states as follows: "the paying bank is 
an agent of is own customer to make payment, [and] the receiving bank is an agent 
of its own customer to receive it."106 However, although the argument that an agency 
relationship exists between the sending-customer and the transferring bank can be 
justified, on the basis of the principles of the common law, it is difficulty to justify the 
agency argument when it comes to the relationship between the receiving/destination 
bank and the payee or beneficiary. There are various reasons for this. 
 First, the agency argument goes against the very basis of the law regarding 
the banker-customer deposit relationship. Cases such as Foley v. Hill107 and 
Joachimson108 have laid down the often quoted principle that when a depositor places 
money in a bank account, the money so deposited constitutes a loan to the bank. The 
 
All E.R. 811; James Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v. Hay's Transport Services Ltd.,[1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 535.
105.
 [1984] 2 All E.R. 304.
106. Mardorf Peach & Co. Ltd. v. Attica Sea Carriers Corp. of Liberia: The Laconia,[1976] 2 All E.R. 249 (C.A.), rev'd 
[1977] A.C. 850 (H.L.).
107.
 Supra, note 1. 
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bank becomes the borrower and as such it can use the funds as it sees fit. The 
relationship is not one of bailment. If this is the basis of the banker-customer deposit 
relationship, then when a bank receives money on behalf of its customer, it does not 
do so as an agent for its customer, but in its own right as a borrower. 
 As well, when a bank transfers funds into a nominated bank account, the 
transfer discharges any debt that the payor owed to the payee. The receiving bank 
then becomes the new debtor or in place of the original payor, in respect of the sum 
that is owed to the payee. To argue then, that the receiving bank is an agent of the 
payee, is to say that, contrary to the basic principles of the banker-customer 
relationship, the payee and not the bank owns the funds deposited. 
 Another reason why the argument that the receiving bank is an agent to 
receive funds transferred to the payee is incorrect, is that, such an argument is 
incapable of explaining the point in time when the receiving bank ceases to be an 
agent and becomes the owner of the funds which have been deposited into the 
account of the payee. 
 The better approach, it is submitted, is that when the receiving bank receives 
funds on behalf of its customer, unless there are circumstances which indicate a 
different kind of result, such a receiving bank receives the funds, not as an agent of 
the customer-payee, but in its own right as a borrower and consequently, an owner 
 
108.
 Supra, note 4. 
72 Edmund Kwaw
of the funds. This argument finds support in Midland Bank v. Conway.109 In that case 
Sachs J. held that although a bank received rent on behalf of its customer, who was a 
landlord, it did not do so as an agent for the customer. Rather, in receiving the rent it 
did so in its capacity as a banker, by virtue of the relationship of banker and 
customer. 
 
V. The relationship between transmitting banks and funds transfer  
 networks 
The above discussion shows that the interbank transfer of funds is essentially 
the interbank transfer of financial information. This information results in the 
alteration of the information possessed by the banks concerned. The transmission of 
such financial information is made possible by the use of electronic funds transfer 
mechanisms which are employed by network organisations. It will be recalled that 
these network organisations fall into two categories, namely (1) those networks 
which are concerned with the transfer of financial information alone and (2) those 
networks, which, in addition to being transferors of financial information, are also 
clearing and settlement systems. 
 What the existence of network organisations means is that instead of a bank 
sending a message directly to another bank, it sends it to the network which then 
transmits it to the receiving bank. As between the banks and the network 
 
109.
 [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1165.
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organisations, the relationship is primarily contractual and is concerned with the 
actual communication of the financial information and messages, that is, the transfer 
and delivery of the information or message. The terms of the contract, which will 
usually be contained in the user handbook of the particular network organization, will, 
in most cases, govern aspects of the bank-network relationship such as (a) the 
correct format to be used for the conveyance of the message or financial information, 
(b)security for messages and the prevention of fraud, (c) confidentiality of messages, 
(d) procedures to be followed to obtain redress in the event of network failure or 
malfunction, and 
 (e) the extent to which the network organization guarantees the accurate 
transmission of messages. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The above discussion has revealed clear differences between the common law 
on the banker-customer relationship, and the evolving law on the eurobanker-
customer relationship. As this article has shown, what one can describe as the 
traditional common law on the banker-customer relationship, as laid down in cases 
such as Joachimson v. Swiss Bank, is based on the notion that money is cash or 
specie, and a deposit of money in a bank is a deposit of cash or specie. This notion 
influences the common law approach with respect to other aspects of the banker-
customer relationship. For example, the law with respect the place of repayment of a 
deposit, and the law with respect to the proper law of the deposit. As this article has 
shown, applying the traditional common law approach to the relationship between a 
eurobank and its customer gives rise to problems for several reasons: (a) deposits of 
eurocurrency are not deposits of specie or physical cash, but book entries, (b) the 
transaction straddles a number of jurisdictions, and (c) the place where the book 
entries representing the deposit are made, is not necessarily the place where the 
deposit is repaid. These differences do not augur well for consistency and certainty in 
the law. There is thus the need for the courts to infuse some clarity into the law.  
